Moral responsibility and speaking to the 'dark side of human rights' by Becker, A.
South African Journal of Higher Education     http://dx.doi.org/10.28535/31-6-1627 
Volume 31 | Number 6 | 2017 | pages 45‒60  eISSN 1753-5913 
45 
 
MORAL RESPONSIBILITY AND SPEAKING TO THE ‘DARK SIDE OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS’  
 
A. Becker 
Department of Curriculum Studies 
Faculty of Education 
Stellenbosch University 
Stellenbosch, South Africa 
e-mail: annebecker@sun.ac.za 
 
ABSTRACT 
This article uses a postmodern lens to question assumptions inherent to three normative claims 
for the human rights project in the context of post-1994 South Africa. The claims are that human 
rights are part of humanity’s narrative of progress; that they are universal and inclusive; and that 
their subject is the liberal humanist subject. Kapur (2006) argues that these claims paradoxically 
point to the ‘dark side of human rights’. By plugging data into theory and theory into data (Jackson 
and Mazzei 2012). I argue that student-teachers engage with human rights in a discursive manner 
and structure relations between self and the Other in rational human rights spaces. I pose that by 
choosing responsibility for an Other,1 South Africans can transcend rational spaces and structure 
relations between self and an Other in moral spaces. In moral spaces the conflict inherent to the 
contradictory nature of moral choices and the conflict between self-consciousness and 
renunciation present possibilities for continually re-structuring human rights and a humane world 
(cf. Fanon1967).  
Key words: human rights, responsibility, self and Other, moral progress, in(ex)clusivity, the 
subject of human rights. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Bauman (1994, 243) contends that in a globalised world ‘morality and moral issues tend to be 
increasingly compressed into the idea of human rights’. During recent years these ‘compressed 
moral issues’ have led to close scrutiny of the moral (and political) premise of human rights. 
Kapur (2006) critiques three normative claims made for the human rights project and illustrates 
how these claims paradoxically point to the ‘dark side of human rights’. The normative claims 
on which the human rights project is assumed to be premised, Kapur (2006) poses, are that 
human rights are part of humanity’s narrative of progress; that they are universal and inclusive 
and that the subject of the human rights project is the liberal subject.  
This article aims to question assumptions inherent to the three normative claims and the 
influence thereof on the relations between self and Other in the South African context through 
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a postmodern lens. Although this approach to morality is often equated with the demise of the 
ethical, Bauman (1994) argues that it creates possibilities of finding different ways of 
responding to moral problems such as human rights and social justice. The uncertainty 
characterising moral choices in a postmodern globalised era is not new (Bauman 1994). In 
Black Skin, White Masks (1967, 202) Fanon poses: ‘The starry sky that left Kant in awe has 
long revealed its secrets to us. And moral law has doubts about itself.’ Arendt (2006) in the 
Postscript to Eichmann in Jerusalem ponders whether humans are capable of telling right from 
wrong. This becomes all the more complicated when individual judgment is at odds with 
hegemonic moral views (ibid.). Postmodern self-awareness has only made the uncertainty, 
anxiety and instability of moral choices clearer and provided possibilities of considering such 
choices differently (ibid.).  
Bauman’s (1994) conceptualisation of morality and responsibility for the Other is used to 
examine the assumed normative premise of human rights and student-teachers views on it. 
Bauman has made significant contributions to the sociology of morality, offering a ‘hopeful 
sociological analysis of recent transformations in modernity and its potential emancipatory 
consequences for moral life’ (Hookway 2017, 1). The critique of Bauman’s theory concerns his 
inability to integrate individual morality with processes of socialisation and, as Hookway 
(2017) suggests, that his ethics of Otherness over-emphasises the Other at the expense of 
establishing the self as a self. The Other, Hookway (2017, 9) argues, is constructed as a 
‘universalised and abstracted figure’. Bauman’s theory on postmodern ethics and responsibility 
for an Other does however present possibilities to think beyond narratives of moral decline 
(Hookway 2017) and assumptions inherent to the narrative of moral progress, the in(ex)clusions 
inherent to human rights and the positing of the liberal humanist ‘human’ as the subject of 
rights.  
Narratives of moral decline have in common assumptions that moral behaviour can only 
be secured within a top-down approach. Moral behaviour is regulated by containing the moral 
self through authoritarian social structures such as tradition, religion or community. I argue, 
that Bauman’s analysis of the shift from modernity’s ordered, certain and rule-orientated view 
on moral action to a disordered, uncertain and self-based postmodernity, provides possibilities 
for rethinking morality and moral action (cf. Hookway 2017). Hookway (2017) suggests that 
‘a sociology of morality is needed which goes beyond Bauman’s moral saint,’ searching for a 
new language of self, incorporating being for an Other and cultures of authenticity.  
The shift from modernity to postmodernity and the search for a new moral language of 
self is of interest to South Africans. Apart from the fact that South Africa is imbedded in a 
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globalised liquid world (Bauman 2007), Serequeberhan (2005, 14) poses that for post-colonial 
South Africans to appropriate the ‘to be’, neo-colonial subjugation needs to be confronted. This 
entails ‘a “knowing of one’s self” explorative inventory aimed at appropriating that which is 
possible in the context of a specific history’. For Serequeberhan (2005) this is a political 
question but, I argue that this is also an ethical question. It concerns considerations regarding 
‘what kind of life we want to lead’ in Africa and South Africa (cf. Appiah 2005, 230). This 
would include the continual interrogation of the ‘dark side of human rights’. Moral 
responsibility (responsibility for an Other) can aid this interrogation as it speaks to the 
assumptions inherent to all three normative claims.  
I pose the following questions: What possibilities do responsibility for an Other offer the 
human rights project in the post 1994 South African context, and how will these influence 
conceptions of human rights literacies? After contextualising the project, I draw on data from 
a NRF funded project Human Rights Literacy: A quest for meaning (Roux and Du Preez 2013) 
and theoretical perspectives in order to plug data into theory and theory into data (Jackson and 
Mazzei 2012). I conclude with some of the possibilities that responsibility for may offer post-
1994 South Africa and conceptions of human rights literacies.  
A brief description of diverse views on responsibility and morality (relevant to this 
context) follows. 
 
MORALITY, RESPONSIBILITIES AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
There are multiple ontological stances to human rights and therefore various views on the 
relation between human rights and morality (cf. Du Preez and Becker 2016). Multiple views 
furthermore exist as to what responsibility means and who the demand for responsibility speaks 
to. Responsibility for and of human rights is framed within vertical and horizontal2 approaches 
to the realisation of human rights.  
Within vertical approaches, proponents of the ‘responsibility approach’ to human rights 
argue that responsibility is the bridge between claims made by subjects of rights and the 
identification of those who should deliver on those claims (De Smet, Dirix, Diependaele and 
Sterckx 2014). Responsibility is also a key concept in the normative language of global politics 
(Beardsworth 2015). In global political discourse, responsibility is framed in two ways. One is 
moral responsibility, which is concerned with the alleviation of undue human suffering (ibid.). 
The other is political responsibility, which refers to the responsibility of state actors to tie 
conditions of internal sovereignty (independence from other states) to conditions of internal 
sovereignty (respect for human and civil rights) (ibid.). The nature of vertical relations is 
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determined by the identification of who should deliver on human rights claims and the extent 
to which state actors accept their moral and political responsibility to respect human and civil 
rights (Beardsworth 2015; De Smet et al. 2014).  
Perry (2013, 775) introduces a horizontal approach to the responsibility debate when he 
argues that the ‘fundamental imperative’ of human rights is in article 1 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (1948): ‘all human beings [should] act towards one another in 
the spirit of brotherhood’. This ‘fundamental imperative’ Perry (2013) argues, is the normative 
grounding of human rights and implies both a vertical and horizontal approach to 
responsibilities. The phrase ‘all human beings’ can be interpreted as pointing to both individual 
and collective responsibility. For Arendt (2003) assigning individual legal or moral 
responsibility for violations of human rights is not the answer. She poses that all members of 
humanity are collectively responsible for every violation of human rights (2003). The 
responsibility (collective and individual) of all human beings to act towards others in the spirit 
of brotherhood is reiterated by Sen (2001, 282) arguing that: 
 
As people who live – in a broad sense – together, we cannot escape the thought that the terrible 
occurrences that we see around us are quintessentially our problems. They are our responsibility 
– whether or not they are also anyone else. 
 
As the aim of this article is to question the influence of the assumptions inherent to the three 
normative claims on relations between self and Other, the focus will be on individual moral 
responsibility. I argue that responsibility for is not a duty or obligation but a response to the 
demand of an Other. The self chooses to be responsible for. The self may also choose not to be 
responsible for and this choice is equally free (or unfree).  
Understandings of morality and the influence thereof on relations between self and Other, 
are often related to notions of obligations and duties. Words like ‘duties’, ‘responsibilities’ and 
‘obligations’ are the ‘do-the-right-thing-words’ (Appiah 2005, 230). Morality is then often 
described as what the self owes the Other (ibid.). Although individual moral choice is perceived 
to be free, p’Bitek (2005) poses that humans are not born free, they cannot be free and they are 
incapable of being free. He goes further and states: ‘For only by being in chains can he (sic) be 
and remain human’ (p’Bitek 2005, 73). The relationships and conditions which make us human, 
chain us and define our freedom (ibid.). The tension between self-consciousness and 
renunciation inherent to freedom and the chains that keep us human, Fanon (1967) however 
argues, creates the possibilities to construct new conditions towards a ‘human’ world. In a 
human world, Fanon (1967, 203) acknowledges only one right for the self: ‘the right to demand 
human behaviour from the other’. 
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The face of an Other commands the self to make the choice to be responsible, Bauman 
(1994) argues. For Bauman (1994, 250) moral responsibility is ‘the most personal and 
inalienable of human possessions, and the most precious of human rights’. Bauman (1994, 75) 
suggests: ‘Responsibility conjures up the Face I face, but it also creates me as moral self’. The 
act of answering an Other creates the space in which the moral self is constantly being born and 
the space in which the self is not with an Other but for an Other. From this solitary act, 
communion and togetherness emerge. We are law-abiding thanks to society, but we are society 
thanks to being responsible for an Other. In demanding moral responsibility, the Other enables 
the self to confront the tension between self-consciousness and renunciation in an attempt to 
enable the conditions for a humane world (cf. Fanon 1967).  
In Postmodern Ethics, Bauman (1994) argues that morality is ‘incurably aporetic’: the 
majority of moral choices humans make are between contradictory impulses. Moral 
phenomena, he argues are inherently ‘non-rational’. Moral phenomena do not fit the means-end 
scheme and escape explanation in terms of utility and service. They can never be regular, 
repetitive, monotonous or predictable and cannot be contained in a rule-book (ibid.). 
Accordingly, for Bauman (1994), morality is not universalisable. This does not imply a 
relativist and ultimately nihilist view of morality. Rather, the moral self tends to be imprisoned 
by an assumed universal morality which presupposes that moral acts can be expressed in rules, 
duties and obligations and in such a manner, be given universal form (ibid.). Ultimately, this 
means that an articulated version of universal morality, stifles moral impulses and channels 
moral capacities into socially designed targets, tending to the destruction of the moral self. 
(ibid.). Before data and theory are ‘plugged in’, I provide a brief overview of the project. 
 
CONTEXTUALISATION AND METHODOLOGICAL PROCESS 
The NRF funded project Human Rights Literacy: A quest for meaning questioned students’ 
understanding of human rights literacy (Roux and Du Preez 2013). The project consisted of two 
phases. Phase one, the national phase, was completed during 2013 and the second, international 
phase, commenced during 2015 (Roux and Becker 2016). The data used in this article are drawn 
from the first (national) phase of the project. 
During the first phase three strategies were used to collect qualitative and quantitative 
data: a walk-about2013, a survey2013 and small focus group discussions2013 (Becker, De Wet and 
Parker 2014). Two consecutive small focus-group discussions (FDG2013) per year group were 
conducted on the six sites to validate the data and to review the literature, ontologies and 
epistemologies (Roux and Du Preez 2013). A total of 68 students were selected by means of 
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snow-ball sampling (Cresswell 2013). Only data from the first focus group discussions are used 
for the purpose of this article. During the first focus group discussions, one question was posed 
to student-teachers: Do you think human rights exist? Data emanating from the first phase 
(2013) small focus group discussions were referenced thus: FGD2013_S1Y4M1, indicating Site 
1 (S1), fourth year students (Y4), first meeting (M1). At some of the sites, two small focus 
group meetings per year group were held – these are referenced M1a or M1b (meeting 1 group 
a or meeting 1 group b) (Roux and Becker 2016). Student-teachers participating in the focus 
group discussions were between 18 and 28 years old and spoke six of the 11 official languages 
(Becker, De Wet and Parker 2014).  
I use Jackson and Mazzei’s (2012) approach to data and theory in which they use a process 
of plugging data into theory and theory into data in an attempt to provide possibilities for dense 
and multi-layered treatment of data in qualitative research. ‘Plugging in’ makes it possible to 
use multiple voices (such as voices of participants, theoretical voices, voices of other scholars, 
documents, and contextual interpretations) in a continuous process of making and unmaking 
theory and data (Mazzei and Jackson 2012). As the volume of data stemming from the focus 
group discussions made it impossible to use all the data, ‘chunks’ of data (Jackson and Mazzei 
2012) were used. The chunks of data illustrate the entangled nature of the material and the 
discursive (Mazzei 2014). Student-teachers expressed their views on human rights, 
responsibilities and relations between self and Other in a common discourse and structured 
material relations in, what Bauman (1994) refers to as, cognitive spaces structured to include 
‘others like us’.  
The data are plugged into Bauman’s conceptualisation of postmodern moral action and 
specifically, responsibility for an Other (cf. Jackson and Mazzei 2012). Plugging in requires 
three steps: putting philosophical and theoretical concepts to work (in this case Bauman’s 
notion of responsibility for), determining analytical questions possible within a theoretical 
concept (questioning assumptions of moral progress, inclusion and the subject of rights) and 
working data chunks towards a suppleness of meaning.  
 
DO HUMAN RIGHTS ENABLE OR PROMOTE MORAL PROGRESS? 
The time-space narrative of normative progress is related to the fact that memory is structured 
in linear and vertical terms in modernity (Bauman 1994). In terms of morality, before (pre-), 
means lower, outdated or inferior while post- refers to a superior future, defined by the victory 
over the defeated Inhuman (ibid.). In a discursive political realm, the post-1994 epoch is 
narrated as the moral victory over inhuman and immoral colonial and apartheid periods. 
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Student-teachers described this with comments like: ‘Yes, since before 1994 the people know 
that there was that thing of discrimination against each other during apartheid and since 1994 
till now we have the rights to do anything you like’ (FGD2013_S1Y1M1a). ‘From 1994 we 
changed. We want to be better’ (FGD2013_S1Y1M1).  
These comments are not rooted in the lived materialist experiences of many South 
Africans or students: the recent #MustFall protests attest to that. Data from the NRF funded 
project Human Rights Literacy: A quest for meaning (Roux 2012), point to the inability of the 
South African Bill of Rights (1996) to make South Africa a moral place. The explorations in 
South African contexts of in(ex)clusions, racism, gender othering, classism, multi-religious and 
-cultural relations in curriculum and education, stemming from this data, all point to persistent 
patterns of exclusions and violations (Roux and Becker 2016; Becker and Du Preez 2016; De 
Wet, Rothmann and Simmonds 2016; Rothmann and Simmonds 2015; Becker, De Wet and 
Van Vollenhoven 2015; Becker, De Wet and Parker 2014). It thus seems that these student-
teachers position their views in a discursive realm which in the words of Dlamini (2010, 12) is 
driven by assumptions that the nation is ‘living democratically ever after’ post-1994.  
Student-teachers furthermore described how normative progress and human rights are 
sustained by responsibilities. They perceived an intimate link between rights and 
responsibilities. They argued that rights bring responsibilities and moral progress. 
 
Participant 3M:  Human rights caused responsibilities (FGD2013_S5Y1M1). 
Participant 1F:  We forget that with rights come responsibilities ... So the people will know 
better. I live in this country, I start from this. I have this right and these 
responsibilities (FGD2013_S5Y1M1). 
Participant 1M:  ... I have a right to, but also have a responsibility I have to take 
(FGD2013_S2Y1M1). 
 
There seemed to be little ambiguity or contradiction in student-teachers’ acceptance of the link 
between rights and responsibilities. They regard ‘taking’ responsibility as a consensual, 
collective, rational choice and action. For Bauman (1994), however, choosing to ‘take 
responsibility’ within such a context is no choice at all; as he argues, many ‘I’s’ can only make 
a ‘we’ if all are identical. Choosing from a collective, consensual morality only means ‘being 
in the right’ by following rules (cf. Bauman 1994). There is no indication that these student-
teachers experienced tension between self-consciousness and renunciation inherent to freedom 
when they ‘take’ responsibility (cf. Fanon 1967).  
In the South African educational context, the link between rights and responsibilities 
running through the data from all six sites might reflect the emphasis given to it in basic 
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education. During 2011 the Department of Basic Education published Building a culture of 
responsibility and humanity in our schools. A guide for teachers (DBE 2011a) and the Bill of 
responsibilities for the youth of South Africa (DBE 2011b). The preamble in both these 
documents states: ‘I accept the call to responsibility that comes with the many rights and 
freedoms that I have been privileged to inherit from the sacrifice and suffering of those who 
came before me ... I accept that with every right comes a set of responsibilities.’ (DBE 2011a, 
8). Apart from the fact that the preamble implies a narrative of moral progress, these documents 
propose a link between rights and specific responsibilities. Tables of responsibilities (rules/code 
of conduct) are linked to every right i.e. The right to education (right): attend school regularly, 
work hard, respect your teachers, adhere to the school’s code of conduct (responsibilities) 
(DBE 2011b). Tables of rights and responsibilities are furthermore prevalent in textbook 
chapters on human rights for teacher education (cf. Jordaan 2014). Student-teachers from sites 
1, 3 and 6 recited the responsibilities related to rights especially in regard to the right to 
education: ‘I have the responsibility to attend every day’ (FGD2013_S3Y1M1); ‘When they 
taught you that you have a right to education and the responsibility to learn’ 
(FGD2013_S6Y1M1).  
For student-teachers the aim of responsibilities is to keep the human rights project in ‘line’ 
by controlling behaviour. Responsibilities regulate moral behaviour in a top-down approach: 
 
Participant 1F:  Like you have a right, and then there is a line drawn, that is your responsibility 
(FGD2013_S3Y1M1). 
 
Self and Other, according to student-teachers, will suffer the consequences if they do not choose 
to do the ‘right thing’. During a discussion with fourth year student-teachers at site 1 
(FGD2013_S1Y4M1), responsibility and the consequences of not behaving responsibly were 
explained as follows:  
 
Participant 1M:  OK. I will make an example. You are in a classroom there are rules how to 
behave. You do not behave and the teacher takes you out of the class then. If 
she takes you out of the class your rights to education are violated in that 
respect. So your responsibility in terms of that. What did you do to be taken 
out of the class? Why did the teacher take you out of the class? Just to add to 
what he said let’s look at this in terms of the law there will be consequences so 
some of my rights will be removed from me because of what I have done ... 
Participant 3M:  Yes, and the way you behave is also violating human rights. If I behave in a 
good way I will hold my rights. If I behave badly, I will lose my human rights. 
Sometimes you blame other people instead of looking at yourself – the way 
you behave. 
Participant 2F:  So if you behave responsibly your rights will be upheld. If you are 
irresponsible your rights will be affected.  
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The certainty and consensus reflected by the remarks from student-teachers suggest no 
contradictory impulses regarding moral choices. It indicates a commitment to structuring a 
world characterised by rules, clarity, stability and certainty. In spaces where ‘the world is rock 
solid and prompts no doubts as long as habitual, routine actions will do’ (Bauman 2001, 57), 
moral security and progress are guaranteed. Being with the Other in spaces where ‘others like 
us’ understand the rules also structure a sense of belonging: belonging to a group who does ‘the 
right thing’. Those who do not act responsibly, or who mis-understand the rules, are cast out. 
They become right-less.  
Participant 1M and 2F described the consequences of not doing the right thing by using 
the hypothetical and discursive you. They agree on the judgment served to the hypothetical you: 
you will be right-less. The hypothetical you are unrelated to their lived reality. It is only when 
participant 1M relates his example to ‘the law’ that he uses I and me. Participant 3M described 
his view on the consequences of not doing the right thing personally: ‘If I behave in a good way 
I will hold my rights. If I behave badly, I will lose my human rights’. Participants 1M and 2F 
do not seem to think that they can ever be the hypothetical you, not doing-the-right-thing. The 
hypothetical I will never be right-less; not because human rights are inalienable, but because 
the hypothetical I will do-the-right-thing by sticking to the rules and doing her duty. In a 
discursive realm, doing-the-right-thing, sustains the assumed narrative of moral progress.  
 
ARE HUMAN RIGHTS INCLUSIVE? 
The human rights project has since the Enlightenment, comfortably accommodated claims of 
universality and inclusion with exclusion and subjugation (Kapur 2006). The historical 
development of the humanist model, shaped in the ideal of Europe as the One with 
universalising powers, self-reflexive reason and a hegemonic cultural model, saturated human 
rights from its inception (cf. Braidotti 2013). The original human of humanism, (white, male 
and propertied) is still implicitly and explicitly posited as categorical and qualitative standard, 
opposing the sexualised, racialized and naturalised other (Braidotti 2013). Throughout human 
history, as soon as the Other attempts to enter the spaces reserved for the ‘human’ in human 
rights, a crisis ensues.  
Social space, Bauman (1994) argues, is a complex interaction of three distinct processes 
namely: cognitive, aesthetic and moral. Al three processes are characterised by proximity/ 
distance and closeness/openness. Cognitive and moral spaces are relevant to the context of this 
article. Cognitive spaces are constructed ‘out of sedimented, selected and processed memory of 
past encounters, communications, exchanges, joint ventures or battles’ (Bauman 1994, 146). 
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Through this knowledge, spaces consisting of ‘others like us’ and ‘others not like us’ are 
structured.  
The historical infringement of the Other in spaces reserved for self has three possible 
consequences: the Other is the enemy and is fought and expelled, the Other is the temporary 
guest (keeping to the rules) or the Other wants to be the neighbour. In the last instance the Other 
has to behave like the neighbour, before being considered as the-neighbour-to-be (Bauman 
1994). Sticking to rules, codes of conduct and responsibilities, prevent dis-ruption, and mis-
understanding between self and the neighbour (cf. Bauman 1994). 
For student-teachers, doing-the-right-thing could result in the tentative inclusion of the 
Other in spaces reserved for the subject of human rights. By acting responsible, the self invites 
or allows the Other to be included in the outer skirts of the human rights circle: ‘This is the 
problem ... the cause of that is that sometimes people focus more on their rights and forget 
about others ... the responsibilities’ (FGD2013_S1Y4M1); ‘... the right of allowing somebody 
else, firstly, to letting that person also have an education, like it’s your right to education’ 
(FGD2013_S5Y1M1). 
Allowing the Other to be in(ex)cluded in the South African human rights project is 
complicated by what seems to be distrust in the ability of human rights to structure moral 
relations, as indicated by these comments from site 5: 
 
Participant 1F:  I don’t think somehow human rights can make them to change and make them 
treat other people different (FGD2013_S5Y4M1). 
Participant 1F:  Why would I adhere to respecting the right of somebody else? You understand. 
Why would I not violate the rights of those, because I can see around this is 
what is happening ...? (FGD2013_S5Y1M1). 
 
In the larger socio-historic context of South Africa, the first excerpt might indicate distrust 
related to trans-generational knowledge of the Other stemming from South Africa’s colonial 
and apartheid history (Becker 2015). Data indicate that student-teachers prefer to stick to ‘others 
like us’ and are afraid of ‘others not like us’ (Roux and Becker 2016). As two student-teacher 
from site 1 and 4 explained: ‘We don’t know how they live and how they carry themselves’ 
(FGD2013_S1Y1M1b), (Roux and Becker 2016) and ‘[human rights are] ... to protect you from 
other people’ (FGD2013_S4Y4M1b).  
The comment of participant 1F is however premised on her personal experience: ‘I can 
see around this is what is happening’, and not necessarily on transgenerational distrust. This 
speaks to the consequences inherent to historical othering and material conditions which human 
rights are unable to address. The question: Why would I adhere to respecting the right of 
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somebody else? indicates the conflict between self-consciousness and renunciation. The 
participant questions the assumption that she owes the Other and the assumptions regarding 
human rights as an inclusive moral concept. While Bauman argues that the face of an Other 
demands choosing responsibility for an Other it remains an equally (un)free choice. The conflict 
inherent to choosing between contradictory impulses, however, presents the possibilities for 
acknowledging cultures of self-authenticity and the structuring of a moral language of self 
(Hookway 2017). It presents possibilities for post-colonial South Africans to confront ‘knowing 
of one’s self’ (Serequeberhan 2005), and the Other without the over-emphasis of the ethics of 
otherness.  
When the Other keeps to the rules and is allowed into the outer circle of the human rights 
project, the Other becomes part of ‘others-like-us’. In being with ‘others like us’ a rational or 
cognitive human rights community is structured. A rational community consists of ‘rational’ 
agents who, as representatives of the community, speak a common discourse (Biesta 2004). 
This is evident from the discursive nature in which student-teachers present their views on 
human rights. Through such discursive processes the voice and presence of the Other is nullified 
and the rational community re-produces and maintains categories of ‘the Other’ through the 
human rights project (Biesta 2004).  
For student-teachers, the Other is an abstracted figure. The Other is framed in a rational 
and discursive realm: somebody else, them. For Bauman (1994) being responsible for is not 
concerned with the inclusion of an Other in rational or cognitive spaces reserved for ‘others 
like us’. When the self includes an Other by choosing responsibility, the self cannot ‘know’ an 
Other. Derrida (1978, 159) defines the Other as the Stranger, who, when she is ‘reduced to a 
real moment of my life’ experiences violence. We cannot know the Other, we should recognise 
the Other as something outside of the self and respect her for what she is: other (ibid.). The 
Other becomes an included Other not in rational or cognitive spaces but when, as Fanon (1967, 
203) proposes, we: ‘simply try to touch the other, feel the other, discover each other’.  
As Biesta (2004, 317) explains, ‘when I speak to the stranger, when I expose myself to 
the stranger, when I want to speak in the community of those who have nothing in common, 
then I have to find my own voice, then it is me who has to speak’. Acting and speaking in a 
community of those with nothing in common defy the rules and the codes of conduct protecting 
‘others like us’. It requires both self-consciousness, renunciation (cf. Fanon 1967) and a search 
to know the self (Serequeberhan 2005). Choosing to act and speak ‘in my own voice’ not only 
marks the continual birth of the moral self and the subject(s) of human rights, but the beginning 
of togetherness and communion with an Other. If the self, through self-consciousness and 
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renunciation, defies the notion of the liberal humanist Human in opposition to the sexualised, 
racialized, colonial, economic or political Other, and chooses to speak and act in responsibility 
for the different other, new possibilities for inclusion in the human rights project emerge.  
 
WHO ARE THE SUBJECT(S) OF HUMAN RIGHTS?  
At the heart of the human rights project, Kapur (2006) argues, lies the liberal humanist subject 
and in(ex)clusions and the narrative of progress are intimately tied to the preservation of this 
subject. The invitation to the Other to be included in the human rights project can therefore 
never be unqualified. When the self therefore chooses responsibility for an Other, different from 
the self, it puts the self, outside the protection of rules and duties in a state of in(ex)clusion. The 
moral self is now haunted by the suspicion that she can never be moral enough (Bauman 1994.). 
This anxiety characterises responsibility for an Other. A student-teacher from site 4 questions 
his responsibility for an Other as follows:  
 
Participant 2M:  ... but it is my responsibility to treat you fairly and to consider your rights as 
well. Everything is about me, me, me but I think, what can I do? How can I 
treat you fairly so that we are equal and ... (FGD2013_S4Y4M1a). 
 
This excerpt indicates a questioning of the moral rules of engagement with the Other and a 
conflict between self-consciousness and renunciation. This is the awakening of the moral self 
but it is not the awakening of ‘I am I’. It is the awakening of ‘I am for’: (Bauman 1994, 78).  
The risks, loneliness, anxiety and uncertainty which characterise the choice for an Other, 
when leaving rationality and the security of rules behind, were debated by student-teachers from 
site 1 (FGD2013_S1Y4M1):  
 
Researcher:  For example: Mr Mandela. He acted out of compassion. He broke the law. He 
went to prison. Was he a responsible person? 
Silence 
Participant 3M:  It makes sense. 
Participant 3M:  You can look at it that way. It does make sense but then you have to be sure 
it’s the right thing. Obviously if it is not .... Then .... 
Participant 2F:  It does make sense but then what about your rights? 
Participant 1M:  If I stand up for others and break some laws, if I defend other people’s rights 
then maybe they take me out of school, I am in jail ... 
Participant 3M:  It’s a sacrifice ... 
Participant 2F:  But they won’t have my back. You have to look at both sides. 
Participant 3M:  On this case something happened here on our campus. Once a guy here, he was 
from the SRC. He was fighting for other students who had no financial aid in 
the residence. So they tried to burn the car but that guy was caught alone and 
sent out of school. You see ... He will come here next year to finish his degree. 
Becker Moral responsibility and speaking to the ‘dark side of human rights’ 
57 
 
He had only three modules left. You see ... But what happened to those students 
he was fighting for? They are still here. After what he did they got what they 
wanted but he .... So in your perspective what did Mandela get? He spent 27 
years in jail. Alone. Alone. Some people [South Africans] they don’t care about 
that. They are doing good. There is nothing wrong with their lives. You see .... 
When you come across those situations you need to think critically. 
Participant 2F:  Yes. 
Participant 3M:  Think twice. 
Participant 1M:  You have to think twice because he was not released from prison ... 
Participant 2F:  Yes, because in time of trouble when you are fighting for someone else they 
won’t be with you if you are in jail. 
Participant3M:  You are right. They will run. 
Participant 1M:  They will run away from you but you were trying to help them. 
Participant 2F:  It is very hard. That situation you need to think. 
Participant 3M:  Yes, before you act you have to think. 
 
Student-teachers had a clear understanding of the virtually unbearable burden of responsibility 
for an Other – of the expectations related to Bauman’s ‘moral saint’ (Hookway 2017, 1). The 
anxiety and uncertainty that result from acting outside the right-thing-to-do, acting outside the 
safety of duties, rules and laws are evident from their discussion. They expressed concern for 
the sacrifices such a choice might demand. They understood that the act of choosing 
responsibility for is non-reciprocal (cf. Bauman 1994). The power of choosing responsibility 
for lies in the freeing of the self from a collective morality, universalised as rules, duties and 
codes of conduct. It lies in a search for the authentic moral self(ves). The birth of moral self(ves) 
constitutes multiple subject(s) of human rights. There cannot be a ‘we’ in choosing 
responsibility for. Multiple moral subject(s) of human rights, in their difference, in diverse 
contexts and situations, have to continuously re-choose responsibility for an Other and speak 
in their own voice(s) to in(ex)clusions and the narrative of progress. 
 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The assumption inherent to the claim that human rights enables a narrative of moral progress is 
premised on the view that humanity is moving towards a humane inclusive world. The irony, 
that no victory over inhumanity seems to have made the world, or South Africa, a safer, more 
moral place, does not seem to detract from this narrative (cf. Bauman 1994). The subject of 
human rights has since the Enlightenment been premised on the liberal human of humanism. 
In(ex)clusions in the human rights project have historically circled around the protection of this 
subject within rational human rights spaces. For the different other to become the subject of 
rights and to be included in the human rights project, the other must become ‘like us’. In keeping 
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to the rules and by doing-the-right-thing, the Other can be included in rational human rights 
spaces. When the Other falters, she pays the consequences; she becomes right-less. 
Transcending rational human rights spaces requires answering the demand of an Other. In 
answering and choosing responsibility for, South Africans, as the moral subject(s) of human 
rights, could create opportunities to interrupt the rhythm of time and change the content of 
society with regard to assumptions regarding the assumed subject(s) of rights and 
in(ex)clusions. This would, however, require South Africans to move beyond what is assumed 
to be owed to the Other in terms of duties and responsibilities. South Africans need to construct 
an authentic language of moral self(ves). This language should speak to personal 
responsiveness and responsibility (cf. Biesta 2004).  
Education is pivotal in this regard. In contrast to rational communities in which learning 
is understood as an acquisition of knowledge about human rights, juxtaposed against 
sedimented transgenerational distrust of the Other, communities with nothing in common 
understand learning as responding in responsibility to the voice and the face of the stranger 
(Biesta 2004). By creating pedagogical conditions in which teachers and children can be 
responsive and responsible for an Other, they can speak, in their own voices to the ‘dark side 
of human rights’ (cf. Biesta 2004; Kapur 2006). 
In light of the growing critique on the (in)ability of human rights education to speak to the 
‘dark side of human rights’, I propose teaching and learning towards human rights literacy(ies). 
Human rights literacy(ies) include cognitive skills and literacy(ies) regarding social and moral 
practices. Through teaching-learning towards human rights literacies, rational discursive human 
rights spaces in educational contexts can be disrupted and transcended. When moral spaces 
between self and an Other are structured in responsiveness and responsibility, the moral premise 
of human rights becomes a bottom-up and situated result of the conflict inherent to choosing a 
self-conscious moral voice and the renunciation of the ‘dark side of human rights’.  
Although being Bauman’s ‘moral saint’ may be an impossible task, we could learn from 
his theory on postmodern morality. Conceding that moral choices are ‘non-rational’ and always 
between contradictory impulses, South Africans could use the conflict inherent in choosing 
responsibility for to ‘come to know self’ and an Other as subject(s) of rights within what 
Serequeberhan (2005, 14) calls the ‘infinity of traces’ left by colonialism and apartheid. By 
embracing the individual and collective conflict, anxiety and insecurity which a search for self 
might bring, South Africans may find a balance between self-consciousness and renunciation 
and re-construct a humane world (cf. Fanon).  
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NOTES 
1. In reference to Booth (1999) I use the Other and an Other alternatively to indicate the nature of 
the relation between self and Other. The Other refers to a relation of distance. An Other refers to 
a relation of proximity in which self faces an Other and responds accordingly. 
2. For a detailed explanation of the realisation of human rights and human rights values in vertical 
(state and citizens) and horizontal (self and other) relations, see Becker, De Wet and Van 
Vollenhoven (2015). With regard to understandings related to dignity, equality and freedom, the 
data indicate that student-teachers seem to understand human rights either as legal interests within 
a vertical relationship, or in terms of values such as caring, Ubuntu, or respect indicative of a 
relationship between self and other (horizontal relations) (Becker, De Wet and Van Vollenhoven 
2015, 1) 
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